Mr A. J. Hibbert (Institute Affiliate, introducing the discussion) [This is an abridged and amended version of the presentation made to the meeting by Mr Hibbert. The paper which appears immediately before this discussion had not been produced in its final form before this meeting, and was not presented to the meeting.]: There are three themes which will recur a number of times:
the approach that we take to valuation of insurance financial contracts; -the concept of hedging the risks that arise in offering those contracts; and -the assessment of prudential capital to back those financial claims.
If you carry away anything useful from this meeting, we would like you to take away these three basic ideas and the way in which the new approach to valuation and capital management deals with them.
There is no question that life companies have struggled with a number of challenges in recent years: managing with-profits guarantees as well as guaranteed annuity options, which were discussed at the sessional meeting in January 2003 (Wilkie et al., 2003) . Life companies carry other types of guarantee, such as guaranteed minimum pensions (where there are similar and significant challenges in valuation risk management), as well as products such as equity-linked bonds and high-income bonds with embedded equity market risks. They all contain options (different guarantees) and complex asset backing. These products pose significant challenges for those responsible for financial management. The new ideas and techniques that have been developed over the past few decades offer us a set of tools for understanding, managing and hedging these financial contracts. We now have technology available (with modern computers) to tackle these problems. The calculations given in the paper were simply not practical 20 years ago. The new technology offers a wonderful opportunity for today's actuaries.
There are three basic ideas that I would like you to take away from this meeting: We think about
(1)
Realistic valuation. The regulators and accountants are promoting the idea that finding a realistic value for a financial claim is equivalent to finding the cost of a set of assets that will replicate the financial claim.
(2) Hedging. The insight that our analysis offers is that the replicating portfolios that are identified also reveal the strategies that can be used for removing risk exposures. In some cases these replicating portfolios are static combinations of assets; in other cases they can be combinations of assets that are adjusted dynamically over time.
(3)
The approach to estimating the magnitude of prudential capital requirements. Importantly, the value of a financial claim will not depend on how the assets are invested. However, the amount of prudential risk-based capital that a life office needs to hold will depend on the investment strategy selected.
The definition of fair value used by the Fair Values Working Party is: "the amount for which liabilities could be settled between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm's length transaction" (Hairs et al., 2002) . What does it mean in practice? It can be helpful to think about the 'replicating portfolio', which is a collection of assets which could include derivative instruments. The payoff of this collection of assets should ideally match the cash flows from the financial contract that we want to value. If we can find such a collection of assets, the realistic value of the financial claim will be the market value of these assets. Closely allied to this concept is the principle of no-arbitrage. The fact that arbitrageurs could take advantage of differences in the cost of replicating portfolios and the financial contract value means that the two should sell for the same price.
The insights of the option pricing theory, developed by Black and Scholes and other researchers are not our focus. We ask you to take the idea of dynamic replication on trust.
Moving on to a more realistic and more interesting example, we have developed a case study of a single element of with-profits business. This is shown in the paper. Note, however, that it is possible to scale up to much more realistic examples with many potential elements of business.
In summary, we have two simple models for asset returns that do a reasonable job of recovering asset prices from the market, together with some rules that define how the contract operates. In practice, these 'rules' will vary between offices and between contracts.
There is demand to codify more of these largely unwritten rules as a result of the forthcoming 'principles and practices of financial management' required by the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The investment policy rule looked quite realistic when we proposed it. However, having been through the past 12 months, it now looks quite a conservative assumption.
For the lapse rate we have a dynamic rule which says that if the ratio of current asset share to accumulated guarantees falls within given ranges, the lapse rate changes. Estimation of plausible parameters is quite a difficult area. However, it is helpful for the purposes of analysis to understand how sensitive the valuation is to lapse behaviour. In the extreme, where asset shares fall to below half accumulated guarantees, the lapse rate falls from 4% to 1% per annum. This implies that when the policyholder has a very valuable guarantee in his hands he is less likely to lapse the policy (compared to normal behaviour). This dynamic effect will add to the cost of the guarantee in our analysis. Different life offices adopt quite different views on how emerging guarantee strains are shared between different generations of policyholders. The fair value that we estimate could be very sensitive to the policy adopted by an office. Very conveniently, for the purposes of this initial study, we have assumed that these costs are not shared between different generations. Essentially, they are borne by the office.
Finally, how is the policy specified? We assume a 50-year-old male holding a policy with ten years to maturity and an annual premium of £800. The current asset share is £13,000, and the current accumulated guarantee (sum assured plus reversionary bonus) is £16,000. The policy is intended to be representative of typical with-profits business. We use a stochastic model (a Monte-Carlo simulation model) to generate a very large number of scenarios for potential equity market returns and interest rate movements. We apply all our various rules and --where possible --pay 100% of unsmoothed asset share. Note that there are no formal smoothing rules applied, although it would not be difficult to add such rules into the analysis.
There are two components to the guarantee. Easily the most important is the maturity guarantee itself. In around 80% of the simulations the maturity guarantee does not result in any cash flow strain. However, there is a long tail of outcomes were assets fall short of the maturity guarantee and the office has to find additional capital from somewhere. From Figure 3 .2 you can see that there is around a one-in-ten chance of a maturity guarantee cash flow strain of £2,000 or more. The other smaller component of the guarantee relates to the guarantee offered on death.
We place a value on the benefits of the policy, including the guarantees by running the model and discounting in a special way using a 'risk-neutral' set-up of the model. The value of the mortality guarantee is £629 and that of the maturity guarantee is £19, giving a total value of £648 in addition to the asset share.
The rest of my remarks and those of Mr Turnbull are about how this cost, £648, changes in different environments. In addition, we discuss how the resulting risk exposure can be managed and how much additional prudential capital should be held (depending on how assets are invested).
The sensitivity of the guarantee value to the liability assumptions and to changes in current market conditions are discussed in Section 3.6. The opportunity to cut reversionary bonus and to switch assets away from equities reduces the value of the guarantees significantly. This shows the economic value of the discretion enjoyed by life office management. In this example the removal of the dynamic lapse assumption does not significantly increase the guarantee value.
As expected, shifts in the current value of the asset share have a significant effect on the value of the guarantees. The value is also sensitive to the implied volatility of equities.
Implied volatility is the way in which traders express option prices, and it is used to calibrate the asset model. If options became more expensive, the value of the guarantees increases. This can occur with no change in current market levels. Thus, changes in market conditions (both market levels and implied volatility) significantly alter the realistic value of with-profits guarantees. The challenge is how to manage this variability arising from sources outside the office's control.
Mr C. J. Turnbull (introducing the discussion) [This is an abridged and amended version of the presentation made to the meeting by Mr Turnbull. See Mr Hibbert's introduction for the reason.]: In summary, what Mr Hibbert has described we have done, and what we want to talk over is how we can build a stochastic model of with-profits business, taking inputs of some financial market prices and making some assumptions about how the liability will behave. Taking these together, we have calculated a realistic valuation of a policy and in particular, of the guarantees' costs attaching to it. The realistic value has a special meaning, in that it represents the cost of replicating the guarantee liability.
We can use the model to understand the composition of the replicating portfolio and how it changes over time. We can investigate the variability of the guarantee value over time and the implications for the volatility of the value of the assets that we choose to back it. We investigate the associated capital requirements on a risk-based economic basis.
One of the key messages of our analysis is how important the dynamic nature of the management of with-profits business is for the realistic values of that business. The fact that the life office can mitigate adverse circumstances by reducing bonus rates and EBRs reduces the sensitivity of the guarantee value to asset returns. The volatility of the fair value is significantly reduced by the life office's discretion, and the appropriate hedges for the remaining risk are quite different to those that would be required in the absence of such discretion. This is illustrated in Figure 4 .1.
We investigate this further by plotting, in Figure 4 .2, what is known by option traders as the delta. This is the gradient of the lines in Figure 4 .1 -the rate of change of the values of the guarantees with respect to asset share. This graph is vital in understanding the extent of the risk of the guarantee and how we can mitigate that risk.
We see that at the current level of the asset share, the delta allowing for the office's discretion is only around one-third of the size of the without-discretion case (-0.08 compared to -0.20).
The office's discretion reduces the delta considerably compared to the without discretion case as asset values fall. However, at very low asset values the deltas are similar (although, of course, the value of the guarantees allowing for discretion is substantially lower than without discretion). We now know the guarantee value of £648 and the associated delta of -0.08. Therefore, we can construct the basic hedge portfolio which has equal and opposite exposure to asset share returns. This involves selling 8% of the current asset share in the same asset mix and investing the proceeds and the £648 value in risk-free assets. This portfolio has the same value as the guarantees. This is a dynamic portfolio in reality. The portfolio will have to be rebalanced frequently because the delta is a function of the asset share. So, as asset shares and time evolve, the delta will change and the hedge portfolio will have to be changed. Importantly, much of the benefit of hedging strategies can be obtained through fairly infrequent rebalancing of the portfolio. Although the textbook idea of continuous trading is a necessary one in order to obtain useful theoretical results, much of the practical benefit can be found through some fairly simple infrequent rebalancing strategies.
In Section 5.2 we investigate the effectiveness of the simple hedge strategy. We compare the guarantee profit (the change in the value of the hedge portfolio less the change in the value of guarantees) after one year for the simple hedge with that generated from investing the £648 value of the guarantees in cash or in the same investment mix as the asset share. As can be seen in Figure 5 .2, the hedge removes the exposure to asset share returns fairly well, although the dependence has not been completely removed, in particular in times of very poor returns. The reason for this is that the hedge portfolio has not been rebalanced over the year. However, even without rebalancing, the potential guarantee losses have been significantly reduced relative to investing in a risk-free asset.
However, the value of the guarantee at the end of the year also depends on the implied volatility at that time. Figure 5 .4 shows how allowing for varying implied volatility levels spreads the range of guarantee profit when compared to Figure 5 .3. The hedge portfolio still performs markedly better than the other strategies considered, but it is clear that where the guarantees are marked-to-market regularly, movements in implied volatility can cause significant losses. The simple hedge strategy cannot reduce this exposure to implied volatility. In order to do so, we need to introduce options to the hedge portfolio.
We illustrate two further possible hedge portfolios --one buying a put option and one buying a put and selling a call (a collar strategy). We choose the put option to have the same delta as the value of the guarantees at the current market level, and invest the balance in cash. However, as can be seen in Figure 5 .9, the delta of the put option portfolio diverges markedly from that of the value of the guarantees. The rate of change of delta (known as gamma) is far greater for the put option portfolio than for the value of the guarantees. The collar strategy reduces the gamma of the hedge portfolio by selling a call option. This gives a better fit, as can be seen from Figure 5 .11. The figures 5.12 and 5.13 show the guarantee profit under the three different hedge strategies. As expected, the collar strategy gives the least variability in result.
Now we consider what this means for risk-based capital requirements. We estimate the capital that we require to fund the liabilities with a specified level of confidence.
The capital can be split into two components --the realistic value of the guarantees (£648) and a mismatch reserve. The realistic value of the guarantees is a theoretical minimum for the capital requirement.
There are at least two approaches to quantifying the mismatch reserve. There is what we call the run-off approach, which is the more natural actuarial approach. This involves using a stochastic model to project the guarantee shortfalls that arise on the policy and by making assumptions about the assets that are used to fund those shortfalls, discounting those shortfalls back to the present. We can identify a percentile of the resulting distribution of funding costs as an assessment of the capital needed.
This approach assumes that the investment strategy of the capital cannot be changed in the future. This can be seen as unduly harsh.
An alternative approach is to calculate the capital sufficient to fund the value of the guarantee at a given point in the future with a given level of confidence. This can be viewed as giving credit for the flexibility of investment strategy, as it can be seen as allowing for a switch to a fully matched investment strategy at the end of the time period considered. This Value at Risk (VaR) style approach is similar to the approach used by banks to calculate their risk-based capital. The second approach gives a lower capital requirement for a given confidence level, but unfortunately it is harder to calculate for life office liabilities. Figure 5 .13 shows the capital requirements sufficient to fund the value of the guarantee after one year with 99% probability. It shows that the mismatch reserve needed for the collar strategy is far smaller than that needed if the assets backing the guarantee were invested as the asset share or in cash.
There are implementation challenges in applying these ideas in practice. The most obvious is the difficulty of asset model calibration where prices of comparable risks are not liquid or transparent. This creates a need for a standard setting authority, possibly an Actuarial Standards Board.
There is also sometimes a perception that hedging strategies such as these are too difficult to apply in practice -for example they require constantly having to sell equities into falling markets. However, it is unlikely that implementing dynamic hedging of guarantees would produce more selling than has been seen in recent years. We have to recognise that if we write risky guarantees with limited capital, we have to sell risky assets when they fall in value. The aim of this work is to help arm the actuary with an additional tool that can give information to aid the management of this process.
In any case, no matter how hard it is to manage these risks, we need to analyse and understand our risk exposures.
Mr Hibbert: There are some radical changes being faced by actuaries involved in running life offices at the moment in the changes that are being promoted by the FSA regarding realistic valuations and the setting of prudential capital. The key themes of our example: valuation of liabilities in a manner which is consistent with prices observed in the market; understanding the sensitivity of those valuations to movements in financial markets; and configuration of the assets that are held by the life office in a way which minimises the impact of market movements on the office's financial position. The consequent improvement in risk management practice will bring significant benefits to policyholders, shareholders and regulators. There is no question that the new ideas pose some significant challenges for actuaries: (Wilkie et al., 2003) . The authors have looked at a slightly simpler structural problem, the maturity guarantee for a with-profits policy, but in a more complicated way because they have allowed for the dynamic hedging, the dynamic movement of the asset share, and the bonus rate which we were not allowing for in our paper.
I should like to ask the authors what differences they can see between their paper and ours. I can see one difference. We described fair value in a slightly different manner. If a mismatching reserve, what we called a contingency reserve or quantile reserve, is needed, then the shareholders, or whoever is providing that capital, would require return on that capital. So, the amount at which the liability would be transferred between willing parties would not be your fair value, as nobody would take it on at that price, as they would have to put up the extra mismatching reserves. Therefore, the fair value would be a little bigger than you are suggesting, though obviously, if a hedging strategy is used, so that the mismatching reserves are much smaller, then the extra addition is also reduced.
The capital requirements shown use the structure which we described as marking-tomarket every year. However, what if the management of the office says: "Marking-to-market every year means that we may have to put up some extra capital to allow for the profits and losses each year. What we would really like to do is to put up enough at the beginning of the policy in extra capital so that we have a 99% probability of not having to put up any extra capital according to the regulator's rules during the course of the policy". That is quite a lot stronger than the valuation described, but how does one calculate that, and how much stronger is it? This was the principle of the Maturity Guarantees Working Party (Ford et al., 1980) . Mr Turnbull: I am uncomfortable with the argument that the fair value should increase to allow for the capital requirement. Everyone else in the market also has capital requirements, whether they be banks, life offices or whatever. All market prices must make allowance for these capital requirements, so there is potential for double counting here if we are not careful.
The fact that capital requirements can change over time (depending on the actual economic environment) does not invalidate this approach to measuring capital requirements. Indeed, it is surely a necessary feature of any reserving regime that it fully reflects the current environment at any time. The challenge is for offices to measure and to manage the potential variability in capital requirements using a rigorous approach to risk management.
Mr A. M. Eastwood, F.F.A.: On Professor Wilkie's last point, I concluded that there is no answer as to how much capital you should set up in advance that will avoid further capital needs. The answer is that you are forced into adopting a hedging strategy. You can begin with enough capital that will provide you with a certain probability of being able to pursue a mismatching strategy at the outset, but inevitably you will go down one of many different paths over the course of the product's lifetime and find that there is a certain probability that you no longer have the capital at some particular point to continue to pursue that mismatch strategy. At that point you are forced towards a hedging strategy.
Mr Turnbull referred to the market impact issues and that hedging strategies are unlikely to produce significantly more selling than has been seen in recent years. I am somewhat surprised at that. It strikes me that, if financial economics has a flaw, it is that it is so critically dependent on the market being right, in the sense that the price that you calculate is the price that you can obtain in the markets. That is all very well and good if we have deep and liquid markets, but the financial markets are not that deep nor that liquid compared with the size of the mismatches that life offices and other institutions traditionally run. Perhaps we should not have allowed that kind of the mismatch to develop. That is another question, but the mismatch is there. If we look at the scale of the guaranteed mismatched liabilities that exist and if we all move towards actively hedging, people on the other side of these transactions will react, whether we do it ourselves through the dynamic process, or whether we buy some options or even sell some calls. I sense that the implied volatility will increase further. The only way out is something that will happen naturally; we will stop mismatching these guarantees, we will stop offering guarantees altogether, and the retail marketplace will eventually see that there is an opportunity as the equity risk premium increases and those who were unconstrained by having mismatched their liabilities will move in, and the equity market may recover. However, I have some anxieties that, at this particular point in time, the equity market will be driven lower and lower as everything gets marked-to-market and people bail out of equities at the wrong time. I should be very interested to hear views on this possibility.
Turning to personal experience, businesses take their lives in their hands when codifying product rules. This takes a long time. You can experiment with a stochastic model, and I did a lot of this some years ago. When I did it, it was not a market-consistent model, but I did discover that you can reduce the risk significantly by refining both the investment and the bonus strategies that are programmed into the model. Life offices are imminently going to have to codify their principles and their practices of financial management. The risk is that we have not got far enough down the experimentation and testing line collectively, and we codify rather too much, removing some of our freedom that we will need to employ techniques along the lines described and others.
Mr Hibbert: We have presented a framework for understanding, valuing and managing risks. Implicit in the framework are a set of actions for life office managers. We do not envisage a world in which life companies instantaneously and costlessly rebalance their assets on a dayto-day basis. We view the framework as a means of understanding the dynamic properties of the financial contracts issued by a life office. The models allow us to understand the sensitivities, and, at any point in time, to understand the ideal position for the assets.
It can be useful to think about the way in which investment banks operate. Essentially they aim to measure a number of different exposures -to the equity markets, to interest rates, to volatility and to various other variables. They then aim to buy and sell assets to remove those risks as far as possible. This type of thinking is usable by life company managers. We know the assets that we have; we can estimate what the ideal position would be. The life office manager's objective will be to move towards that ideal position over time. That will not always involve selling into a falling stock market.
Over the last 12 months we have considered what the transactions related to a dynamic strategy for a sample policy would have been compared to the switches that life offices have made in the United Kingdom. Perhaps not surprisingly, given that it has been such an extraordinary year, we believe that the level of equity sales under a dynamic approach would have been lower. It is, of course, an unusual environment.
When we first started talking to life offices about codification, maybe five or ten years ago, I remember being told by a number of actuaries that it was not possible to write these rules down. It was argued that, in a given situation, the actuary would know what to do. That may or may not be the case. However, there are some new pressures to change now. The requirement to create PPFMs is the clearest example. We do not pretend that this is simple to achieve. However, it is an important ingredient in a wider set of changes.
Mr R. K. Sloan, F.F.A.: I should like to comment on the communication of results. I do not doubt the wisdom and merits of developing a more economically coherent, market-consistent approach to measuring the risks inherent in with-profits business. However, when the discussion turns to stochastic modelling and the like, then I am minded somewhat of the 'Emperor's New Clothes' -with me cast as the little boy! Therefore I make a few very simple, but practical observations. My first point is that the output of a stochastic model is only as good as the underlying modelling formulae, which I have never seen set out in full; moreover, even if I had, I confess that I doubt whether I would understand them. However, that is partly my point, in that I question whether the stochastic model of, say, five years ago, would necessarily have allowed a reasonable probability of three consecutive years of stock market decline -or should that now be four years or even five years?
By contrast, imperfect though deterministic methods may be, I think that it is at least arguable that the public and also the regulators, perhaps, have a better chance of understanding their results, or rather a lesser chance of misunderstanding them. For example, to state that resilience tests show that a life office will be able to meet its solvency requirements provided that the FTSE does not fall below 3,000 is at least clear -even if slightly worrying at today's market levels! Mention of understanding by the public brings me to a further related point: the subjective question of perception. To take but one example, the case of the Equitable Life. Its eventual downfall was caused, not so much by the GAR issue or matching as such, but rather by policyholders' reasonable expectations (PRE) that had been built up over many years by the company's various communications to its policyholders. So, by all means carry out stochastic modelling and adopt dynamic hedging, but please let us not overlook the equally important issue of clear and effective communication with policyholders, financial advisers, the press and the public.
Closely allied to that is the possibility of adverse publicity and comment when things are not going so well -such as today -which reinforces the importance of always giving out the right signals, in good times as well as in bad. I am thinking here in terms of good corporate governance, including well-balanced boards of directors, properly constituted remuneration and audit committees, which should apply equally to mutuals as well as to proprietary companies. Although these may seem like mere housekeeping issues, careful attention applied to getting such matters right will pay handsome dividends in protecting against adverse criticism when times are more difficult. In other words, it is not just a question of doing the right thing, but of being seen to be doing the right thing.
Mr Hibbert (replying): The point about the 'Emperor's New Clothes' is interesting, because one thing that we constantly say to those with whom we work is: "Remember, it is only a model." One of the purposes of a model is to simplify and to retain only the key components of a problem.
The question of whether stochastic models reveal the potential extremes (such as three years of equity falls) is an interesting one. One of the problems that we have had in the past is that models do show scenarios with substantial equity falls. Until recently some users found these implausible. As an example, in 1995 we produced an interest rate projection at a time when gilt yields had just dipped below 10%. It was a piece of work on pensions drawdown. The argument was that people should defer annuity purchase because 'obviously' gilt yields would rise above 10%, and so it would be foolish to buy an annuity when gilt yields were 9%. We projected a distribution for three years ahead with a left-hand tail of 5% gilt yields. We showed it to a client, and he said: "How do you expect me to take stochastic analysis seriously when you show me a 5% gilt yield? It simply is not credible." Hindsight is a wonderful thing.
In our projections we look at the Japanese stock market, which today stands at less than one quarter of its peak value some 13 years on from the peak. One of the tests that I apply when I look at our stochastic projections is to try to find 1974 and other major bear markets such as [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] in the United States of America and Japan today. We ought to see everything that has been observed historically in our simulation 'test tubes' (plus some more). We should see scenarios that we have not experienced in the past, but, when we think about it, are credible. Note that the calibration of models for projection purposes is rather different to the market-consistent valuation that we are concentrating on here. Calibration for projection requires an examination of history, as well as analysis of market prices and experts' views of the future. Given the huge changes that have been observed in inflation rates and interest rates over the past ten years, this use of expert opinion is a very important part of the calibration process. I agree that we should all be sceptical about the models, but I think that they actually do rather a good job of illustrating the potential extremes. They probably do a better job than our intuition, which is invariably shaped by quite a short experience in the context of the business with which we are dealing. One of the reasons that people believed that equities were good value three years ago is because most of us have lived in an environment where equity returns have been so strong for so long. As a result, the idea that the market can fall by half, which is absolutely normal for stock markets over the long run, is one that a lot of people have found surprising.
The communication issue is very important. There are some big challenges. We are dealing with new and quite complicated ideas. Consequently, developing effective means of communication is a real challenge.
The President (Mr T. M. Ross, O.B.E., F.F.A.): In drawing the meeting to a close, I want to repeat most of the final paragraph of the paper ( ¶6.5): "Nonetheless, we have developed powerful techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of hedging approaches for with-profits guarantees. As the regulatory and accounting regimes move inexorably towards a marketconsistent framework, such arrangements will surely be worthy of life offices' consideration. After all, effective hedging will help us to manage profit volatility, solvency risk and capital requirements. The next challenge is for the life industry and the actuarial profession to embrace fully this more rigorous, market-based approach to financial risk management."
There is little doubt that the world in which actuaries are working, and not just in withprofits life assurance, but in pensions as well, is going to experience great changes in the years ahead, and that the work which we have discussed will prove to be of great importance as we go forward. Actuaries are going to have to change and to develop their thinking in many walks of actuarial life. Many are already doing so. It is probably a bigger challenge for my generation than it is for the generations which are following behind. The analysis and insights that are made possible by modern technology are indeed impressive. This has been demonstrated by our two main speakers and by the contributions to the discussion.
I noted that there was in the discussion a suggestion of a need for some independent actuarial standard setting body, as methodologies and models begin to expand and to proliferate. I mentioned this in my Presidential Address, and I am pleased to be able to say that the Faculty and Institute Management Committee has established a task force under my chairmanship to look at this question. It is plain that we must develop our thinking in this area very rapidly.
We actuaries have developed our own actuarial language -some might describe it as jargon -over the 20th century. It is not easy for the outside world to penetrate. I suspect that the ideas and techniques that we have discussed may lead to a new language being developed. I noticed in the discussion that different expressions were used to describe the same or very similar things. Perhaps this time we should aim to achieve a common language rather more rapidly and to ensure that, as Mr Sloan suggested, it is accessible to a wider audience. So, I want to encourage, not just an expansion of the thinking behind this discussion, but standardisation of the language in which that thinking is expressed.
On behalf of everybody here I thank the authors very much for such stimulating presentations. I am sure that we will be seeing more of you and following closely the development of your work, and, indeed, participating in it.
